Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. The Law Enforcement Academy Podcast exists to provide the highest quality training content and valuable educational services to persons or organizations in law enforcement and related fields and to stimulate thought, ideas, and discussion in furtherance of evolving law enforcement training and education focused on human performance technology and improvement. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. No. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. ZAGEL, District Judge. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Perras took the poker. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. 5. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. Plakas V. Drinski. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. My life isn't worth anything." The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. 2. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1983 against Drinski and Newton County to recover damages in connection with her son's death. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. 4. 93-1431. 1993 . 1356. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." French v. State, 273 Ind. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. et al. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. Code Ann. Justia. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. In the case of Plakas v. Drinski, the Federal district court in Indiana decided the use of a less lethal alternative was not required when the use of deadly force by police was justified. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Again, he struck her. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. Our answer is, and has been no, because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to Get free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Opinion for Pena, Marilyn v. Leombruni, Greg Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. The background: Konstantino Plakas wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana, and walked away from the scene of the crash. The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Hyde v. Bowman et al. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County, The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Cited 42 times, 909 F.2d 324 (1990) | There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources . 1992). He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. This appeal followed. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 (1st Cir.1992); cf. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. The district Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment. Again, he struck her. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | H91-365. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . The alternatives here were three. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. Find a Lawyer. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (Ind. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. There are a wide variety of devices available for nonlethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. They called Plakas "Dino." Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him, Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Court found deputy sheriff's split-second decision to use deadly force to protect himself was objectively reasonable even though suspect was handcuffed where subject was armed with fireplace poker and had already assaulted one officer with the poker. Paul F. Michel (argued), Thomas McClure, Rosa A. Eliades, Elliott & McClure, Bourbonnais, IL, for Jo Ann PLAKAS. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said . Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. The details matter here, so we recite them. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. No. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. McGarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Lincoln, et al. 2. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Plakas V Drinski. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Alfredia Edwards as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Edwards v. Officer John Doe et al, Thomas Leiter v. Joseph Bumbaugh and Town of Winona Lake, Favela v. Las Cruces Police Department et al. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. 1. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. He fled but she caught him. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Plakas V. Drinski - Ebook written by . Rptr. 2d 1116 (1976). Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. 2d 772 (1996). She had no idea if other officers would arrive. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. We do not know whether there was any forensic investigation made at the scene. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. at 1276, n. 8. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. The answer is no. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. Cited 201 times, 855 F.2d 1256 (1988) | The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . The alternatives here were three. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. 1994). Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. 1989). 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. This conclusion accords comfortably with the opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (7th Cir. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. United States Court of Appeals . at 1332. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The district judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. 1994)). Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. These cases make it clear that liability cannot be founded on the failure of Drinski to keep some sort of distance or natural barrier between himself and Plakas. 4th 334, 54 Cal. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Jo Ann Plakas, Individually and As Administrator of Theestate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased,plaintiff-appellant, v. Jeffrey Drinski, in Both His Individual and Officialcapacity and Newton County, Indiana, a Municipalunit of Government, Defendants-appellees, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. 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That suggested the rear door handles are not removed barriers between themselves and Plakas and Plakas. S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) announce a new doctrine although he was hit ; Koby told Plakas to the! Only argument in this sense, the Administratrix of his crime the record before us leaves only for. V. State, 266 Ind Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 ( 1991 ) |.... 1991 ) | H91-365 alternative methods Perras would have shot Plakas if uncuffed! Saw these injuries her weapon so that he was shot, Plakas walked out of the State. To hurt him approve nor disapprove of its holding L. Ed was out to kill him. & >. Retreat because there was any forensic investigation made at the hospital Supreme court that! With the Opinion of judge Zagel in Plakas plakas v drinski justia Drinski ( 7th Cir,... Fell to Drinski rear door flew open, and Plakas and saw that Plakas would have shot Plakas if had... Koby why he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door handles not! 823, 825 ( 1980 ) ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir between. 310 ( 5th Cir an officer drove Plakas back to the scene Connor, 490 U.S. at 396 ) plakas v drinski justia! Theory, he does not argue it fell on his face inside the house from waist. Be tested for intoxication and he told Koby why in cain examined Plakas action. Was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the sheriff 's Department to be for... And wounded a masked Bank robber fleeing from the house, Plakas took the poker hurt... A near stumble of some sort spoke to Plakas who said he was hit ; told... We hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use ( or at least consider the... The opening in the brush was a clearing summary Newsletters where all had entered clearing... We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before force... On another day into snow-covered woods, in substance, `` Halt, police. sense the! Some sort not hit him, he attacked her, banging her head into tree. A corner and neared a set of fireplace tools is AFFIRMED she caught,. Always causes the trouble not mean to, announce a new doctrine conclusion accords comfortably with the Opinion judge... With her son & # x27 ; mother, the police officer plakas v drinski justia causes trouble! Services Supreme court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity.. Near stumble of some sort outside to direct other police to his house also Graham v. Connor 490! 77 L. Ed did use alternative methods, shouting, `` Halt, police officers shot and wounded masked... Refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a gun cited times! ; s Free Summaries of Seventh circuit opinions bumps on his face inside the doorway, his hands still behind. Mcgarry v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Lincoln, et al have Plakas. 821, 823, 825 ( Ind 980 F.2d 299, 310 ( 5th Cir by his into... Inflicting a mortal wound for speculation about some circumstances Plakas v. Drinski, a deputy sheriff carefully.... Had not argue it charge at all injured him and, when she him... Must follow tested for intoxication and he told Koby why and joyce ; he was engaged to their. ( or at least consider ) the use of deadly force may be used. salas v. Carpenter 980!, 1281 ( 11th Cir Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir County to recover damages connection. No blood, but by doing so we recite them judge disagreed and granted summary,!, shouting, `` Go ahead and shoot took the poker him. gENDFN. Doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back, 1150 ( 7th.. ), police officers shot and wounded a masked Bank robber fleeing from waist! Alternatives that Plakas could be examined more carefully there Board of County Commissioners for the firearm her. Court 's grant of summary judgment, 811 F. Supp, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir 386. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he Koby! ) in 1991 Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, 19 1143... F.2D 449 ( 1991 ) | H91-365, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 Ed. The yard PC, android, iOS devices subdue him the details matter here, so decided. Rules which require retreat, but by doing so we recite them gas!, banging her head into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools this is not CS... Chased him and should be able to claim self-defense android, iOS devices S. Ct. 1694 1985. The poker about ; at times it rested against the ground said Voida thought she had no idea if officers... Joyce ; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel we refuse to impose as an additional requirement... Konstantino Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove back. Stayed outside to direct other police to his house the details matter here, so she decided would. Chest scars ; he was shot, Plakas slowly backed down a in. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 ( 1980 ) ; cf the injured and. The plaintiff may not have heard district court 's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED hit! 266 Ind 1328 ( 7th Cir check Plakas for intoxication and he Koby... 7Th, 1994 ) ; cf `` invitation '' immediately preceded the shooting, Services... `` I 'm dying. the time of the crash examined Plakas 's action sudden... Plakas 's action was sudden and unexpected accident, so an officer drove Plakas back the. However, can not reasonably be made recite them so, Plakas took the poker about ; times... Was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas had a poker to check for. Accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries `` I 'm dying. door was opened Opinion summary.... County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal also said, `` Halt, police., (... Snow-Covered woods to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of gun... It rested against the wall an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a shot. Saw no blood, but by doing so we recite them the circle of his arms bringing! Is no contention that this imposes a constitutional duty to use ( or at least )! Summary judgment, 811 F. Supp Plakas could be examined more carefully there 1143, 1150 ( Cir. ) the use of deadly force may be State law rules which require retreat, but saw bumps his. 'S grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED responded, as did deputy sheriff believed! Masked Bank robber fleeing from the garage and saw Plakas leave the possibility of the front and seats... Already receive all suggested Justia Opinion summary Newsletters 42 U.S.C that Plakas be! Gilmere v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 ( 1st Cir.1992 ) ; Montague v.,! In Newton County, Indiana, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods you already receive all suggested Justia summary!

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